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America's military leaders are guiding for 
the final assault on what they view as the 
biggest obstacle to US military supremacy: 
the Viet Nam Syndrome. Stated simply, the 
Viet Nam Syndrome is the American public’s 
disinclination to engage in future Viet Nam- 
type interventions in the Third World, 
most Americans cheered the US 
from Indochina and the simultaneous 
reduction in our "police” presence abroad, 
some US leaders have campaigned ever since 
to relegitimize intervention as a standard 
instrument of US policy. As discontent ove 
long gas lines and higher oil prices 
intensified, these apostles attempted 
convince the public that military action
be necessary to prevent erosion of our 
privileged way of life. If the public can be 
persuaded to w.-cept this argument, they 
believe, US policymakers no longer need fear 
domestic resistance to future interventions
t many leaders have 
ic acquiescence to 
o n ism , o ffic ia l  
ever closer to a new 
of military force
in
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hindered, many leaders believe, so long as 
the public adheres to its “never again” 
stance on intervention abroad. Hence the 
stepped-up assault on the Viet Nam 
Syndrome.
The Viet Nam Syndrome can be seen both 
as an institutional matrix and as a subjective 
condition. Institutionally, thiB outlook took a 
number of specific forms: (1) passage of the 
War Powers Act and other legislative 
restraints on presidential war-making 
abroad; (2) abolution of conscription and 
establishment of an all-volunteer service; (3) 
curtailment of covert operations by the CIA 
and other intelligence agencies; and (4) 
adoption of the “Nixon Doctrine” and tbe 
creation of surrogate “police” powers such as 
Iran.
These developments had immediate and 
profound consequences for the entire 
national security apparatus. The Armed 
Forces lost halfoftheir uniformed personnel, 
thus eliminating future openings for 
thousands of generals, admirals and other 
top career officers. The Pentagon budget was 
reduced (in non-inflated, “real” dollars), 
causing a significant drop in defense 
contracts. The CIA was forced to undergo an 
unprecedented public probe of its secret 
operations, and lost many veteran “spooks” 
through a massive layoff of senior personnel.
All told, it was the greatest institutional 
setback for the warfare state since the 
demobilization ordered by President 
Eisenhower after the Korean War.
More serious than these institutional 
reverses, however, was the subjective 
response. Once all US troops had been 
withdrawn from Indochina, the nation 
breathed a collective sigh of relief and 
adopted a “ never again” stance on the use of 
US troops to control political changes in the 
Third World. Summarizing this perspective 
in 1975, Senator Edward Kennedy declared 
that “ the lesson (of Viet Nam) is that we must 
throw off the cumbersome mantle of world 
policeman” . In the same spirit, Senator Alan 
Cranston observed, “The United States 
should be a peaceful world neighbor instead 
of a militant world meddler” . This view 
prevailed in 1976, when Congress voted to 
prohibit US military involvement in Angola, 
and again a year later when Washington 
elected to remain on the sidelines during the 
Ethiopian-Somalia conflict.
President Carter, who was elected when 
the Viet Nam Syndrome was at its peak, has 
generally adhered to the non-interventionist 
outlook expressed by Senators Kennedy and 
Cranston in 1975. Although some of his 
advisers — particularly Zbigniew Brzezinski
— called for a military response to particular 
crises, Carter vetoed direct US involvement 
in such conflicts as the Zaire upheaval, the 
Iranian Revolution, the Viet Nam-China 
border war, and the Nicaraguan civil war. 
And despite evidence of a turnaround in 
Administration thinking, this hands-off 
approach still governs official policy: in a 
May 1979 speech to the Am erican 
Association of Community and Junior 
Colleges, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
stated that “the use of military force is not, 
and should not be, a desirable American 
policy response to the internal politics of 
other nations” .
But for some US policymakers, this 
outlook is an intolerable constraint on US 
power at the time of growing challenges to 
American interests abroad. These leaders — 
representing powerful segments of the 
military, intelligence and business 
communities — argue that America’s 
unwillingness to use force in responding to 
minor threats abroad will only invite more 
serious and intractable challenges later. The 
Viet Nam Syndrome, in their view, actually 
fosters instability because it encourages 
hostile powers to exploit the emerging gaps 
in the West’s global security system. 
“Worldwide stability is being eroded through 
the retrenchment of American policy and 
power” , James R. Schlesinger wrote in 
Fortune after his dismissal as Secretary of 
Defense in 1976. “This growing instability 
reflects visible factors such as the 
deterioration in the military balance, but 
also, perhaps more immediately, such 
invisible factors as the altered psychological 
stance of the United States, a nation 
apparently withdrawing from the burdens of 
leadership and power.”
For theBe critics, US non-involvement in 
Angola, Ethiopia, and Iran represents a sign 
of American weakness rather than a 
calculated policy of restraint. “Viet Nam 
caused a loss of confidence in the ability of 
the US to defend non-communist regimes in 
Third World countries against subversion 
and military takeovers by Moscow’s allies” ,
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Business Week observed recently. “This 
perception of paralysis was confirmed when 
the US stood by helplessly as Russian- 
backed insurgents, aided by Cuban troops, 
took over Angola. And it was enhanced when 
the Soviet-aligned Ethiopian government 
crushed separatist movements in Eritrea 
and the Ogaden.”
For advocates of a renewed interventionist 
posture, the Viet Nam Syndrome is not 
merely a misguided policy approach, but 
evid en ce o f a fa r  more profound  
psychological disorder. "O u r  internal 
preoccupations and our political divisions of 
recent years” , according to Schlesinger, 
suggest “a growing infirmity of American 
policy” . Frequently, these critics choose 
words with psychosexual overtones: 
America’s allies have lost confidence in “ the 
firm ness of American policy” ; Europeans 
deplore “ the fa lte r in g  of American  
purpose”; American restraint has “created 
an image of US im potence abroad” . (Quotes 
from Fortune and Business Week.)
Because Carter has generally upheld the 
non-interventionist approach, he has  
become the principal target for such 
complaints. Despite his apparent success at 
Camp David, heis often portrayed as “weak” 
and “indecisive” in responding to foreign 
crises. “The Administration’s response to the 
m ultiplying challenges and disorders 
abroad” , George F. W ill charged in 
Newsweek recently, “ has been a litany of 
things it will not do: interventions it will not 
contemplate, bases it will not seek, weapons 
it will not build. Its policy has been 
symbolized by two aircraft carriers, the one 
Carter vetoed and the one he changed his 
mind about sending toward the Persian 
G u lf’ . The President’s so-called “turn the 
other cheek” policy has also been the topic of 
frequent attacks by leaders of both major 
parties. Senator Howard Baker, for instance, 
has charged that Carter’s failure to defend 
the Shah and other US clients “invite the 
interpretation that we do not have the will or 
th e  r e s o lv e  to  r e a c t  u n d e r a n y  
circumstances” . And in an extraordinary 
1979 address to the Coalition for a 
Democratic M ajority, Senator Henry 
Jackson charged that the Administration’s 
placidity in the face of growing Soviet 
belligerence has “the mark of appeasement” .
These attacks culminated in March 1979 
with a special issue of Business Week on 
“The Decline of US Power” which featured a 
dramatic picture of the Statue of Liberty in 
tears. Arguing that since Viet Nam, the 
United States “has been buffeted by an 
unnerving series of shocks that signal an 
accelerating erosion of power and influence” . 
Business Week’s editors called for a 
revitalized military capacity to protect US 
interests abroad. Without a more activist 
foreign policy, they argued, America’s 
favored economic standing may soon
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vanish, “The policies set in motion during 
the Viet Nam war are now threatening the 
way of life built since World War II.”
The B usiness Week issue was particularly 
significant because it constitutes a rare 
public airing of the intense policy debate 
which has gripped the US business 
community ever since Viet Nam. This debate 
actually originated in the elite struggle over 
the war itself: after Tet and the appearance of 
a broad-based antiwar movement at home, 
the corporate world split into factions 
favoring the continuation of the war and 
others calling for an American withdrawal. 
After the war, this debate was transformed 
into a deeper conflict over America’s role in 
the “ post-Viet Nam” world. This struggle 
pitted those businessmen who felt that 
America’s overseas interests could be 
adequately protected without recourse to 
m ilita ry  action  a g a in s t  th ose who 
maintained that intervention must always 
be considered the “ final solution” to 
America’s political-economic problems 
abroad. The former group, which I have 
chosen to call the “Traders", argued that by 
expanding US trade relations with Third
World governments, America could play a 
sort of global managerial role in spite of 
continued ideological conflict with some 
regimes. The latter group, which I choose to 
call the “ Prussians”, insist that as the world 
becomes more turbulent and chaotic, 
America must use its military clout to 
prevent Third World upstarts from upsetting 
the global economic applecart.
For the most part, the participants in this 
struggle prefer to conduct their battles in 
seclusion — in corporate board rooms, 
private clubs, and exclusive Washington 
restaurants. Because the debates revolves 
around the baBic underpinnings of American 
power, and because it is simply not possible 
to expose the inner workings of elite decision­
making to public scrutiny (it is not proper, for 
in sta n c e , to tell a C o n g re ssio n a l  
subcommittee that Cuban intervention in 
Angola is really good for America because it 
assures stability in Gulf Oil’s Cabinda field), 
this struggle tends to be translated into other 
terms when conducted in public.
The most common expression of this 
struggle, of course, is the debate over the 
“Soviet threat” . Because data on Soviet 
military strength is subject to a wide range of 
interpretations, disputes over the size and 
character of Soviet capabilities are often 
used as surrogates for the more profound 
contest over imperial policy. While the 
Traders argue that Moscow is far too pre­
occupied with domestic problems and 
growing restiveness in Eastern Europe to 
embark upon any major confrontations with 
the West, the Prussians insist that Moscow 
will use its awesome military muscle to 
dominate key Third World areas — 
particularly the Middle East — and thus to 
undermine the western economies. While 
both sides recognize that it is unlikely that 
Moscow would ever be foolhardy enough to 
threaten any really  critical American 
interests, such as oil (despite all the talk of 
Soviet intervention in the Middle East, 
Moscow has been very, very careful to avoid 
any action that could be interpreted as a 
threat to western oil supplies) the Prussians 
argue that the mere existence of large 
Soviet forces might encourage maverick 
Third World governments to be more 
obstinate in their dealings with the West 
than they would be otherwise. Thus, when 
outgoing Secretary o f Energy James
RELEGITIMIZING INTERVENTION 31
Schlesinger warned in August that the 
apparent “ preponderance of Soviet power” 
in the Middle East increases Moscow’s 
capacity for “influence and subversion” of 
the West’s oil supplies, insiders understood 
that it wasn’t M oscow  that he was worried 
about, but rather the growing independence 
of the Mideast oil powers. And when he 
called for a beefed-up American presence to 
discourage Soviet adventures in that area, 
what he really meant is that we must have 
the capacity to crush any indigenous 
challenges to US interests.
This same interplay between the "Soviet 
threat” debate and the deeper foreign policy 
struggle has arisen in the SALT debate. 
Although most of the discussion has focused 
on such questions as ther relative size of the 
superpowers’ arsenals and the verifiability 
of the proposed treaty, the underlying debate 
concerns the perception of power insofar as 
it affects America's capacity to dominate the 
western world. Thus, while no one really 
doubts that America can continue to deter 
any conceivable Soviet assault, critics argue 
that the appearance of Soviet might may 
act as a constraint on our capacity to 
discipline errant regimes abroad. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that pro- and anti- 
SALT senators are moving toward a 
compromise which will involve a massive 
expansion of America’s “ general purpose" 
forces — i.e., forces intended for intervention 
and other non-nuclear contingencies.
The debate over renewed interventionism 
has also arisen in recent discussions of the 
Viet Nam war itself. While most Americans 
still believe that we were right to pull US 
troops out of Indochina, many “realist” 
intellectuals now argue that we’d be better 
off (i.e., no “boat people” , no Cambodia 
conflict, etc.) if we’d stuck it out in Viet Nam 
and demonstrated our “resolve” to protect 
US interests. Needless to say, it follows from 
this logic that if we were right to stay in Viet 
Nam in the first place, we’ll be even more 
right to intervene the next time a Viet Nam- 
type situation arises abroad.
As these debates proceeded, both sides 
have demonstrated assorted strengths and 
weaknesses. By choosing early to support 
Jimmy Carter in 1976, the Traders succeeded 
in placing some of their top leaders in high 
Administration posts. The Prussians, on the 
other h an d , h ave proved adept at
manipulating public opinion and at using 
the “ Soviet threat” hysteria to undermine 
Administration policies. And while the 
Traders have worked wonders at Camp 
David and in other secluded diplomatic 
arenas, the inherent exclusivity of their 
approach (relying, as it does, on secret 
“ understandings” between nominal 
antagonists) leaves them vulnerable to 
charges of “appeasement” — or at least of 
procrastination in the face of growing 
danger. As a result, the Traders have 
gradually lost ground over the past year and 
resistance to intervention (at least in elite 
circles) has significantly diminished.
This trend was already evidentin January 
when the Traders suffered a particularly 
crushing blow: the collapse of the Pahlavi 
Dynasty in Iran. With the Shah no longer 
available to serve as a surrogate gendarme in 
the Persian Gulf, the Nixon Doctrine 
evaporated overnight, and, with it, a major 
prop of the non-interventionist position. 
Although most experts agreed that there was 
little Washington could do to save the Shah, 
the very absence of any meaningful options 
was cited as proof of American “ impotence” .
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After Iran, it became apparent that top US 
policymakers had moved towards a new 
consensus on the use of military force to 
protect “vital” US interests aborad. The new 
outlook was unveiled on February 26, when 
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
Energy both announced that the United 
States would use force if  necessary to protect 
its energy supplies in the Persian Gulf area. 
Appearing on “Face the Nation” , Defense 
Secretary Harold Brown asserted that 
Mideast oil supplies are “ clearly part of our 
vital interests” , and that “in the protection of 
those vital interests we’ll take any action 
that’s appropriate, including the use of 
military force” . On the same day, then 
Energy Secretary James Schlesinger told 
reporters from The New York Times that 
“The United States has vital interests in the 
Persian Gulf. The United States must move 
in such a way that it protects those interests, 
even if that involves the use of military 
strength or of military presence.”
President Carter backed up these 
statements with a dramatic flexing of US 
military muscle during the Yemen crisis of 
last March. Although the origins of the crisis 
are steeped in tribal animosities and the 
fighting was confined to a narrow border 
area, Carter chose to elevate the Yemen 
c o n f l ic t  in to  a m a jor  E ast-W est 
confrontation involving America’s “vital 
interests” . Arguing that the South Yemeni 
attack on North Yemen constituted an 
indirect threat to Saudi Arabia — and hence 
to American oil supplies — the White House 
announced emergency measures designed to 
prevent any further aggression by the Soviet­
armed Southerners. Elements of the 82nd 
Airborne Division (America’s standby 
intervention force) were placed on alert, and 
the aircraft carrier Constellation was 
ordered into the Arabian Peninsula. 
Fortunately, the crisis subsided once Arab 
League negotiators worked out a cease-fire, 
but it could easily have escalated into 
something farmore serious: according to Jim 
Hoagland of the Washington Post, the White 
House was prepared to authorize the carrier’s 
85 warplanes to engage in combat if Soviet or 
Cuban pilots stationed in South Yemen 
joined the conflict.
The Brown-Schlesinger statements of 
February 26, coupled with Carter’s muscle-
flexing over Yemen, have been cited by 
observers both inside and outside the 
Administration as proof that official 
Washington has now recovered from the Viet 
Nam Syndrome. “This country went through 
a very deep philosophical-cultural crisis as a 
result of the war in Viet Nam” , national 
security adviser Zbiginiew Brzezinski 
acknowledged in April, but “it is now 
em erging from  that cr is is ” . The 
Administration’s response to Yemen, he 
noted, “signalled to others that we will use 
force when necessary to protect our 
important interests” .
The events in Iran and Yemen also had a 
big impact in Congress. “The tide that swept 
back US intervention in Viet Nam, 
Cambodia, and Angola could now be turning 
the other way” , The Washington Post 
reported in June. “Strong pressures are 
beginning to build up that could pave the 
way for a return to a more interventionist 
policy, based on military presence, to 
guarantee US access to foreign energy 
supplies.” And in a comment that captures 
the mood of many in Congress, Senator Sam 
Nunn noted recently that, “ I'd rather flex our 
muscles a little bit on a weekly basis than 
have to resort to a great display of force at 
some very high level of danger” .
In response to these pressures, the 
Administration has announced creation of a 
“Unilateral Corps” for intervention in the 
Middle East. The Unilateral Corps — so- 
called because it would be independent of 
NATO and thus available for unilateral 
action by the United States — will consist of 
about 100,000 troops drawn from existing 
army, air force, and marine units, including 
the elite 82nd Airborne Division. Once 
organized, the Unilateral Corps will be 
available, on very short notice, for rapid 
deployment to distant trouble spots such as 
the Persian Gulf. The formation of such a 
“quick-reaction strike force” was originally 
proposed over year ago, but the pace of 
planning was reportedly stepped up in 
February, following the upheaval in Iran.
At this point, it is impossible to predict 
when, and under what circumstances, the 
Unilateral Corps will be ordered into action. 
Several scenarios have, however, received 
wide attention in the military press: 
occupation of Saudi oilfields to prevent their
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takeover by radical Arab forces; naval action 
in the Persian Gulf to protect oil tankers from 
attacks by Palestinian commandos; defense 
of North Yemen or Oman in the event of a 
South Yemeni invasion; and reprisals 
against Colonel Khadafi following Libyan- 
backed terrorist raids elsewhere. Whether or 
not any of these particular scenarios is 
played out is, of course, beside the point. 
What matters is that top U S policymakers 
are apparently committed to the use o f  
military force in the event that critical 
US interests are threatened abroad.
Such action — if and when it comes — will 
not, however, be a replay of Viet Nam. US 
war planners now have to contend with 
many constraints not present in the 1960s. 
First and foremost is the memory of the 
antiwar movement, which argues against a 
prolonged counter-insurgency war with 
daily footage of American corpses being 
flown back home. Economics also play a role: 
Viet N am was an extravagent, fuel-intensive 
war which could not be repeated at today’s oil 
prices without bankrupting the Treasury. 
And the runaway arms trade has profoundly 
altered the in te r n a tio n a l m ilita ry  
e n v iro n m e n t; w h ereas V ie tn a m e se  
guerrillas were armed with relatively 
primitive infantry weapons, potential 
adversaries in the Middle East and Africa 
are armed with the latest French, Russian 
and American combat systems. All this 
means that any future intervention will have 
to be fought with much more precision, 
speed, and ferocity than anything we’ve ever 
seen.
The future “Viet N am s" will diverge from 
the original in another critical respect: the 
character of the rationalizations used to 
justify the war, Whereas the Indochina 
conflict was essentially (if unconvincingly) 
justified on the basis of “ containment” —■ i.e., 
that stopping the Viet Cong was necessary to 
block further Soviet “ expansion” into the 
Third World — any future interventions will 
be justified on more pragmatic grounds. US 
leaders recognize that the American public is 
far more concerned with inflation and the 
energy crisis than it is with convoluted Cold 
War stratagems. They believe, therefore, 
that the next Viet Nams will have to be 
sellable in crass m aterialistic terms: 
intervention is necessary, they will argue, to 
insure a steady flow of oil to the local gas 
pumps. There is also a danger of what
Professor Richard Falk o f Princeton 
U n iv e r s i t y  c a l ls  “ h u m a n it a r ia n  
interventions” — i.e. Entebbe-type raids to 
free civilian hostages or campaigns to topple 
such troublesome deBpots as say, Colonel 
Khadafi, or the Ayatollah Khomaini. (The 
victims of pro-US despots such as President 
Marcos of the Philippines and President 
Park of South Korea should not, however, 
expect such “humanitarian” relief.)
Whether or not the American public will 
swallow such justifications remains to be 
seen. There are still many prominent leaders 
who can be counted on to oppose military 
intervention no matter how it may be 
disguised, and the peace movement, though 
shrunken, is capable o f fairly rapid 
m obilization. But the advocates o f  
intervention clearly believe that most of the 
public’s residual antiwar sentiment has 
been melted away, and that with an 
intensified propaganda campaign the “ Viet 
Nam Syndrome’’ can be extinguished 
completely. When, and if, they conclude that 
they’ve succeeded, the appearance — in 
battle — of the Unilateral Corps will 
probably not be long in coming. Thus all of us 
who worked together to stop the Viet Nam  
war, and all those who believe in seeking 
peaceful solutions to the world’s problems, 
have an immense responsibility to challenge 
the notion that intervention is in the public 
interest, and to advise Washington — as 
loudly as possible — that any repeat of Viet 
Nam will be met with instantaneous and 
unremitting opposition.
